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Abstract. Consider an economy where inﬁnite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable
goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods
are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset’s net supply is positive
or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate ﬁnite present
value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously
reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a
persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium.
Examples of monetary equilibria are provided.
Keywords. Monetary Equilibrium, Bubbles, Default, Collateral, Durable Goods.
1. Introduction
Sequential economies with inﬁnite-lived assets have been studied for quite a long time in ﬁnance
and macroeconomics. In the overlapping generations models by Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973),
as well as in the inﬁnite-lived consumers model by Bewley (1980), money has a positive price,
although its fundamental value (the discounted stream of future returns) is zero. This excess in the
price of an asset over its fundamental value is known as a bubble. However, more recent general
equilibrium models, with inﬁnitely lived agents and incomplete markets, showed that the general
requirements for existence of equilibrium end up limiting severely the occurrence of price bubbles
for assets in positive net supply (such as money, in the above models, and also stocks).
Generic existence of equilibrium, with borrowing constraints (or a priori transversality restric-
tions), was established for uniformly impatient preferences and endowments uniformly bounded
away from zero (see Magill and Quinzii (1996) and also Hernandez and Santos (1996) for related
results). Together, these assumptions imply a joint uniform impatience condition which rules out
speculation for the Kuhn-Tucker deﬂator processes (as in Magill and Quinzii ( 1996)) or if the
deﬂator determines a ﬁnite present value of aggregate wealth (as in Santos and Woodford (1997)).
Moreover, it was also argued that, in economies with suﬃciently productive ﬁnancial sectors, present
values of wealth should be ﬁnite, since aggregate resources can be easily super-replicated using a
ﬁnite-cost portfolio plan.
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Hence, examples of price bubbles for assets in positive net supply and inﬁnite-lived agents, pre-
sented by Santos and Woodford (1997), were regarded as being very fragile, by the authors them-
selves. All examples dealt with the very special case of borrowing constraints precluding short-sales,
as in this case existence of equilibrium dispensed with the above requirements. There were two types
of examples: one (Example 4.5) where joint uniform impatience was violated and another (Examples
4.2 and 4.4) admitting, for some deﬂators, inﬁnite present values of aggregate wealth. The former
had very special endowments (zero beyond the initial date) and did not seem to accommodate the
case of money. The latter were not robust to adding suﬃciently productive assets.
When assets are collateralized by durable goods (directly or through other assets), bubbles may
occur, both for zero and positive net supply assets, under the general conditions ensuring existence
of equilibrium. As in the case of short-lived assets, studied by Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Martinez
(2002), Ponzi schemes can never occur, even for non-uniformly impatient preferences,
1 and the
successive additional endowments of durable goods do not have to be bounded away from zero.
This allows for non-summable deﬂated commodity prices and for asset price bubbles (as illustrated
in our examples, where the Inada eﬀect cancels out the discounting factor). Moreover, adding assets
with suﬃciently productive promises might not end speculation, as these assets might default and
fail to super-replicate aggregate resources.
However, in the case of assets in positive net supply, the occurrence of price bubbles requires more
than just the absence of uniform positive lower bounds for additional endowments. Under complete
markets, price bubbles can only occur when collateral repossession makes the asset’s positive net
supply not persistent. If default occurs or even in the borderline case, when agents are indiﬀerent
between honoring the promise or not, the collateral (or part of it) is surrendered, the asset’s positions
decrease and its positive net supply is reduced.
In the incomplete markets case, bubbles are compatible with persistent positive net supply. The
diversity in agents’ Kuhn-Tucker multipliers processes may allow for the positive net supply to
change hands in such a way that the asset can be priced at inﬁnity without violating individual
optimality. More precisely, each agent perceives a bubble, as the limiting deﬂated price of the asset
will be nonzero, but is not a lender at inﬁnity, since the deﬂated value of her long position tends to
zero.
In our examples we focus on the case of a single asset that pays no dividends. In these examples,
some agents are endowed with money at the initial node and all agents can ﬁnance their purchases
of durable goods by either selling the endowments of money or by short-selling money (using the
durable bundle as collateral). Here money plays the single role of transferring wealth across time
and states of nature. Even in the absence of liquidity frictions money may be essential: a positive
price of money may prevail due to its function in completing the markets or in reducing market
incompleteness.
Our ﬁrst example of monetary equilibrium illustrates the case where the introduction of money
ends up completing the markets. Eﬃcient monetary equilibria always have an asymptotically zero
money supply, but are not unambiguously interpretable as price bubbles. Actually, in this example,
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the economy has a borderline case stationary equilibrium where part of the collateral is always
surrendered. For this reason, the monetary bubble can be reinterpreted as a positive fundamental
value consisting of marginal utility returns from consumption of the part of the money net supply
that is being converted into garnished collateral. Our second example illustrates an incomplete
markets monetary equilibrium where default or even the borderline situation never occur and,
therefore, the bubble is unambiguous since the above reinterpretation is no longer possible. Hence,
there are ineﬃcient monetary equilibria that can only be interpreted as price bubbles.
In both examples ﬁnancial constraints (collateral requirements) are not binding. Contrary to
previous examples in the general equilibrium literature (as in the cash-in-advance model by Santos
(2006) or in the credit model by Gimenez (2005)), the positive price of money is not due to a
positive fundamental value that simply adds up the shadow prices of binding (liquidity or borrowing)
constraints.
Our result on the absence of price bubbles, for the Kuhn-Tucker deﬂators and under uniform
lower bounds on additional commodity endowments, applies not only to assets in positive net supply
but also to zero net supply assets, and, therefore, contrasts with the results for default-free assets,
namely those of Magill and Quinzii (1996). For other deﬂator processes, we lose the relation between
uniformly interior additional endowments and summable deﬂated commodity prices, but we can still
say that asset price bubbles can only occur if deﬂated commodity prices fail to be summable. Here
there seems to be a relationship with the more abstract approach to bubbles proposed (in an Arrow-
Debreu setting) by Gilles and Le Roy (1992).
The paper is organized as follows. The second and third sections present the model. The fourth
section discusses a crucial property of the default model which says that a consumption and portfolio
plan is individually optimal if and only if it satisﬁes Euler inequalities and a transversality condition
on its cost. The suﬃciency part is used to establish existence of equilibrium (in Section 5) and
to compute some examples of monetary equilibria (in Section 8). The necessity part is used to
characterize asset prices (in Section 6). This characterization (which is analogous to the non-
arbitrage valuation studied by Araujo, Fajardo and P´ ascoa (2005)) is the basis for the deﬁnitions
of fundamental values and for the results on absence of price bubbles (in Section 7).
2. The Infinite Horizon Economy with Default and Collateral
Uncertainty. We consider a discrete time economy with inﬁnite horizon. The set of dates is T =
{0,1,...}. We suppose that there is no uncertainty at t = 0, and there are ﬁnitely many states of
nature at the following date, t = 1. In general, given a history of realization of the states of nature
for the ﬁrst t − 1 dates, with t > 1, st = (s0,...,st−1), there is a ﬁnite set S(st) of states of nature
that may occur at date t.
An information set ξ = (t,st,s), where t ∈ T and s ∈ S(st), is called a node of the economy.
The date associated with node ξ is denoted by t(ξ). There exists a natural order in the information
structure: given nodes ξ = (t,st,s) and µ = (t0,st0,s0), we say that µ is a successor of the node ξ,
and write µ ≥ ξ, if t0 ≥ t and st0 = (st,s,...). Given a node ξ, we denote by ξ+ the set of immediate
successors of ξ, that is, the set of nodes µ ≥ ξ, where t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1. The (unique) predecessor of4 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
node ξ is denoted by ξ− and the only information set at t = 0 is ξ0. We write µ > ξ to say that
µ ≥ ξ but µ 6= ξ.
The set of nodes, called the event-tree, is denoted by D. Let D(ξ) = {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ} be
the subtree with root ξ. The set of nodes with date T in D(ξ) is denoted by DT(ξ). Finally, let
DT(ξ) =
ST
k=t(ξ) Dk(ξ) be the set of successors of ξ with date less or equal than T. When ξ = ξ0
notations above will be shorten to DT and DT.
Physical markets. At each node there is a ﬁnite ordered set of commodities, L, which can be traded
and may suﬀer partial depreciation at the nodes that are immediate successors. At each node ξ, the
depreciation structure is given by a matrix Yξ = (Yξ(l,l0))(l,l0)∈L×L with non-negative entries. Thus,
if one unit of good l ∈ L is consumed at node ξ, then at each node µ ∈ ξ+ we obtain an amount
Yµ(l0,l) of the good l0. The structure of depreciation is very general, allowing for instance for goods
that are perishable or perfectly durable and also for the transformation of some commodities into
others. We denote by Yξ(·, l) the l-column of matrix Yξ and by Yξ(l, ·) the l-row. Given a history
of nodes {ξ1,...,ξn}, with ξj+1 ∈ ξ
+
j , the accumulated depreciation factor between ξ1 and ξn is
denoted by Yξ1,ξn. That is, Yξ1,ξn is equal to YξnYξn−1 ···Yξ2, when n > 1; and equal to the identity
matrix when n = 1. For simplicity, we are not allowing for storage.
Spot markets for commodity trade are available at each node. We denote by pξ =
 
pξ,l : l ∈ L

the row vector of spot prices at the node ξ ∈ D and by p = (pξ : ξ ∈ D) a process of commodity
prices.
Financial markets. There is a ﬁnite ordered set J of diﬀerent types of inﬁnite lived securities.
Assets may suﬀer default but are individually protected by price-dependent collateral requirements.
Collateral may consist of consumption goods (Physical collateral) as well as of assets (Financial
collateral). Assets of a given type have the same promises of real deliveries and the same collateral
requirements.
We suppose that for each type of securities j ∈ J there is always an asset that can be issued
at every node. In the absence of default assets of the same type can be treated as being the same
security. However, when an asset issued at a node ξ defaults at a successor node µ > ξ, it converts
into the respective collateral, although agents can constitute at this node µ new long or short
positions on an asset of the same type. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, whenever there is no
possible confusion, we will refer to an asset of type j simply as “asset j”.
Each type of security j is thus characterized by its net supply at t = 0, ej ≥ 0; the process A(ξ,j)
of real promises, which are deﬁned in the set of nodes ξ > ξ0; and the collateral coeﬃcients, which
can vary along the event-tree (see below). We denote by qξ the row vector of asset prices at node
ξ ∈ D, and by q = (qξ,j, (ξ,j) ∈ D × J) a plan of asset prices in the event-tree.
When assets are short-sold, borrowers have to constitute collateral. At each node ξ ∈ D, collateral
requirements per unit of asset j ∈ J are given by functions CP
ξ,j : RL





+, where physical collateral requirements CP
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) may depend on the price of the asset andBUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 5
the prices of the commodities backing it, whereas ﬁnancial collateral coeﬃcients, CF
ξ,j(qξ), may
depend on ﬁnancial prices at ξ. Note that collateral is always held by the borrower.
Holders of asset endowments are not required to constitute collateral when selling these endow-
ments. Moreover, when purchasing an unit of an asset it is not possible to distinguish whether this
unit was short-sold or is part of someone’s endowment. The return from this purchase is the same
in both cases (given by the minimum between the promise and the garnishable collateral) and the
price is also the same. That is, an holder of an asset endowment holds units of the tradeable asset
subject to default and not of the underlying primitive asset free of default with promises A, which
can not be traded.
Also, we assume, for the sake of simplicity (in the market clearing equations), that assets in
positive net supply are only backed by physical collateral,
Assumption A. For each class j ∈ J the functions CP
ξ,j and CF
ξ,j are, for every node ξ ∈ D,
continuous in its domain, homogenous of degree zero and satisfy (CP
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j), CF
ξ,j(qξ)) 6= 0, for
all (pξ,qξ). The commodities and the securities used as collateral for a class j are the same along
the event-tree D.2 Moreover, each class in positive net supply, ej > 0, is protected only by physical
collateral.
In addition to price-independent physical collateral requirements (as in Geanakoplos and Zame
(2002)), the hypothesis above accommodates the following examples:
1) Fixed margin. An asset of type j is backed only by commodity l and, within some bounds,
cξ,j and cξ,j, the quantity of the commodity serving as collateral, per unit of the asset, varies


















2) Mortgage loans. Asset (of type) j is protected only by physical collateral. Unitary collateral
requirements are independent of the price level and, at each node, the depreciated collateral coin-
cides with the current collateral bundle, CP
ξ,j = Yξ0,ξCP
ξ0,j. That is, a given collateral bundle entitles
a borrower to a constant short position, throughout a non-default path, by successively using the
depreciated collateral as the new collateral.
The next hypothesis rules out self-collateralization, that is, the possibility that an asset ends up
securing itself, even if this is done through a chain of other assets,
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ξ and nodes µ ∈ D.6 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ

















Remark 1. A consequence of the assumption above is the existence of a pyramidal structure on the
set J, whose basic layer consists of assets backed only by physical collateral, and the successive layers
are collateralized only by assets in the previous layer. More formally, the set J can be decomposed
into a disjoint union of sets (Λk)k≥0 which are independent of the price level (as a consequence of
Assumption A) and are deﬁned by
Λ0 =

j ∈ J : CP



















Λr, ∀k > 0.
Moreover, if Λk 6= ∅ then Λr 6= ∅, for all r < k. Thus, the set of assets that are backed only by
commodities is non-empty. Therefore, even without assets in positive net supply, physical collateral
exists, as a consequence of the absence of self-collateralization in the economy.
For convenience of notations, let CVξ,j(p,q) = pξCP
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) + qξCF
ξ,j(qξ) be the value of the
unitary collateral requirement of asset j, at node ξ.
As the only enforcement in case of default is given by the seizure of the collateral, borrowers will
pay (and lenders will expect to receive) the minimum between the depreciated value of the collateral
and the market value of the original debt. Thus, the (unitary) nominal payment made by asset j
at node ξ is given by Dξ,j(p,q) := min{pξA(ξ,j) + qξ,j,DCVξ,j(p,q)}, where DCVξ,j(p,q) denotes







where the recursive rule above is well deﬁned due to Remark 1 above. To shorten notations, we
introduce the following row vectors CVξ(p,q) := (CVξ,j(p,q), j ∈ J), Dξ(p,q) := (Dξ,j(p,q),j ∈ J)
and DCVξ(p,q) := (DCVξ,j(p,q), j ∈ J).
Agents. There exists a ﬁnite set, H, of inﬁnite-lived agents in the economy.3 At each node ξ ∈ D,
each agent h ∈ H can choose a short ﬁnancial position ϕh
ξ = (ϕh
ξ,j)j∈J, an autonomous long position
θh
ξ = (θh
ξ,j)j∈J (that is, asset purchases in excess of required ﬁnancial collateral) and an autonomous
consumption bundle xh
ξ ∈ RL
+ (that is, consumption in excess of required physical collateral). As





































3Our goal is to use a set up which has been considered to be the most hostile to bubbles, when agents are
inﬁnite-lived. For this reason, we did not allow for incomplete participation.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 7
Each agent h ∈ H is also characterized by ﬁnancial endowments at the ﬁrst date eh = (eh
j)j∈J ∈
RJ
+, which satisfy ej =
P
h∈H eh
j, and by a physical endowment process wh ∈ R
D×L
+ .
Furthermore, given prices (p,q) ∈ P, consumer h’s objective is to maximize her utility function
Uh : RD×L → R, that represents her preferences over the plans ˆ xh, by choosing a plan z = (x,θ,ϕ),






+ which satisﬁes the following budgetary constraints
(1) pξ0xξ0 + CVξ0(p,q)ϕξ0 + qξ0 (θξ0 − ϕξ0) ≤ pξ0wh
ξ0 + qξ0eh,
and for all ξ > ξ0,











Thus, given prices (p,q), we deﬁne the budget set of agent h, Bh(p,q), as the collection of plans
(x,θ,ϕ) ∈ E such that equations (1) and (2) hold. Moreover, it follows from Assumption A that
we can restrict the price set to P := {(pξ,qξ)ξ∈D : (pξ,qξ) ∈ ∆
L+J−1




Remark 2. The non-negativity condition on the autonomous consumption represents the physical





ξ,j, which is equivalent
to xh
ξ ≥ 0. Analogously, the non-negativity of the autonomous long position reﬂects the ﬁnancial
collateral constraint.
Market clearing. Real returns from asset endowments have to be taken into account in the market
clearing conditions. When an asset does not default, the real returns from asset endowments coincide
with the promised real returns. In this ﬁrst case, the asset will remain with the same positive net
supply that it had at the preceding node. However, in the case of default, real returns generated
by assets’ endowments will be determined by the depreciated physical collateral coeﬃcients. In this
second case, the asset can be traded again, as long as the collateral requirements are again satisﬁed,
but the positive net ﬁnancial supply disappears. In fact, the previous positive net supply has been
entirely converted into a supply of garnished collateral.
In the borderline case, when borrowers are indiﬀerent between surrendering the depreciated
collateral and honoring the promise, in value terms it does not matter whether the collateral is
garnished or the promise is payed, but, for the purposes of market clearing, this choice becomes
relevant. This choice will determine also whether the asset’s net supply will decrease or not.
For this reason, given prices (p,q) ∈ P, we introduce, at each node ξ 6= ξ0, delivery rates λξ,j ∈
[0,1], which are equal to one when the promise is lower than the value of the garnishable collateral,
equal to zero when the opposite strict inequality holds, but may take a value between zero and one
in case of equality.
Actually, since the promise and the garnishable collateral coeﬃcients are impersonal, the delivery
rates may vary across agents but there is no rationale for such diﬀerences. Hence, we can concen-
trate our attention on outcomes where, in the case of indiﬀerence between paying the promise and8 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
surrendering the collateral, all agents choose the same combination of these two, that is, the same
delivery rates.
Using the delivery rates λξ, the eﬀective nominal return of an asset j in positive net supply,
Dξ,j(p,q), can be seen as the value of a real component plus the value of a ﬁnancial position,
Dξ,j(p,q) = pξ





where the real component is either the promised physical delivery or the depreciated physical col-
lateral or a combination of the two.
Definition 1. An Equilibrium for the Inﬁnite Horizon Economy is a vector of prices (p,q) ∈ P
jointly with individual plans
 
(xh,θh,ϕh), h ∈ H

∈ EH, and delivery rates λ ∈ [0,1](D\{ξ0})×J,
such that
A. For each agent h ∈ H, (xh,θh,ϕh) ∈ Argmax{Uh(ˆ x), (x,θ,ϕ) ∈ Bh(p,q)}.
B. At each node ξ 6= ξ0, the asset j delivery rate satisﬁes,
λξ,j ∈ Argminλ0∈[0,1] [λ0(pξA(ξ,j) + qξ,j) + (1 − λ0)DCVξ,j(p,q)].
























, ∀ξ 6= ξ0.









































3. Assumptions on Agents’ Characteristics
We make the following hypotheses on agents’ endowments and preferences,
Assumption C. For each agent, the cumulated resources generated by her own physical endowments
up to each node ξ, Wh
ξ , belongs to RL
++. That is, for each node ξ ∈ D, that occurs as result of an





We do not need to impose any uniform lower bound in the aggregate cumulated resources,
P
h∈H Wh
ξ . Thus we allow for durable commodities whose aggregate resources converge to zero.
Also, as commodities can be durable, the traditional assumption that individual endowments of com-
modities are interior points can be replaced by the weaker assumption that requires only individual
accumulated resources to be interior points.
Now, as we allow for assets in positive net supply, the aggregated resources up to a node ξ not
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quantities of past resources, but also the streams of real resources generated by the positive net
supply of assets.
As assets in positive net supply are protected only by physical collateral, an upper bound for the




























The following assumption guarantees that agents attain a ﬁnite level of utility at feasible con-
sumption plans, even when accumulated endowments are not uniformly bounded along the even-tree.
Assumption D. The utility function for the agent h, Uh, is separable in time and in states of nature,
in the sense that Uh(ˆ x) :=
P
ξ∈D uh
ξ(ˆ x(ξ)), where the functions uh
ξ : RL → R are strictly concave,
continuous and strictly increasing in their convex eﬀective domain Ah
ξ, which satisﬁes RL
+ ⊂ Ah
ξ.
Moreover, Uh(W) < +∞.
The above hypothesis is weaker than Magill and Quinzzi (1996) assumption of uniform impatience,
which is satisﬁed by recursive stationary utility. An even stronger assumption, jointly on preferences
and endowments, of uniform impatience, was deﬁned by Santos and Woodford (1997), in the context
of exogenous net supplies of assets, as follows: For each h ∈ H, there exists σh ∈ [0,1) such that for









for all consumption plans satisfying ch
µ ≤ ˜ wµ, with µ ∈ D, and all σ ≥ σh, where ˜ wµ is the aggregate
commodity resources up to node µ.4
4. Individual Optimality
In this section we present necessary and suﬃcient conditions for individual optimality. As in pos-
itive dynamic programming theory, we will show that the default structure gives to the Lagrangian
a sign property under which Euler inequalities jointly with a transversality condition are necessary
and suﬃcient to guarantee the optimality of a consumption-portfolio plan.
Given prices (p,q) ∈ P, denote by zξ = (xξ,θξ,ϕξ) ∈ Z := RL×RJ ×RJ a vector of consumption-
portfolio choices at node ξ and by gh






≤ 0 ⇔ (p,q,zξ,zξ−) veriﬁes the budget constraint of node ξ,
where for convenience of notation we put zξ
−
0 = 0. Therefore, at prices (p,q), the objective of the
agent h is to ﬁnd a plan (zh














≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D,
zξ = (xξ,θξ,ϕξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D.
4Notice that ˜ wµ includes the real returns from assets’ net supply at preceding nodes, which are not exogenous in











For each real number γ ≥ 0, let Lh
ξ(·,γ;p,q) : Z × Z → R be the Lagrangian function associated
to consumer problem at node ξ, which is deﬁned by
(3) Lh
ξ(zξ,zξ−,γ;p,q) = vh
ξ(zξ) − γ gh
ξ(zξ,zξ−;p,q).
As under Assumption D the function Lh
ξ(·,γ;p,q) is concave, we can consider its super-diﬀerential
set at point (zξ,zξ−), ∂Lh
ξ(zξ,zξ−,γ;p,q), which is deﬁned as the set of vectors (L0
ξ,1,L0
ξ,2) ∈ Z×Z
















The above vectors L0
ξ,1 and L0
ξ,2 are partial super-gradients with respect to the current and past
decision variables, respectively.
The following proposition states necessary and suﬃcient conditions to guarantee that a plan
(zh
ξ)ξ∈D is a solution of the agent’ h maximization utility problem. The suﬃciency depends crucially
on the following sign property of the Lagrangian,
(5) L0




which is very speciﬁc to the default and collateral model. In fact, as for each asset j ∈ J short sales
eﬀective returns Dξ,j(p,q) are not greater than the respective garnishable collateral values, the joint
returns from actions taken at immediately preceding nodes are non-negative (see Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions C and D hold.




ξ)ξ∈D gives a ﬁnite optimum to consumer’ h prob-
lem, at prices (p,q) ∈ P, then there exist strictly positive multipliers (γh






































(ii) Reciprocally, the existence of non-negative multipliers (γh
ξ )ξ∈D satisfying conditions above for a
budget feasible plan zh = (zh
ξ)ξ∈D assures the optimality of zh in (Ph).
(iii) Using multipliers that satisﬁes (EE)’s and (TC) as deﬂators, the present value of endowments





An attainable consumption and portfolio plan satisfying Euler and transversality conditions gives
the consumer a ﬁnite optimum, as the next corollary points out.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 11





ξ)ξ∈D is attainable with respect to the aggregated resources of the economy






ξ,j ≤ Wξ), then the optimum of problem (Ph) is
ﬁnite.
The above Euler conditions will be used below to characterize the prices of assets and commodities
that are compatible will individual optimality, or equivalently, that rule out arbitrage opportunities.
As our immediate objective is to guarantee the existence of equilibrium, we postpone this character-
ization of asset prices to Section 6 (see Proposition 2). It is worth discussing here the interpretation
of the above transversality condition and comparing it with related conditions used in the literature.
First, it should be noticed that the above transversality condition is not a constraint that is
imposed together with the budget restrictions (as was the case in Hernandez and Santos (1996) or
Magill and Quinzii (1996)), it is rather a property that optimal plans should satisfy.
Secondly, as the deﬂated value of endowments is summable, our transversality condition (CT)
can be rewritten as requiring that, as time tends to inﬁnity, the deﬂated cost of the autonomous







ξ = 0; (TCx)






ξ (CVξ(p,q) − qξ) ϕh
ξ = 0; (TCϕ)












ξ) (see Appendix A).
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of the previous proposition, if the process (Wξ)ξ∈D, of upper
bounds for the aggregate physical resources, is uniformly bounded by above along the event-tree and
the process (wh
ξ)ξ∈D, of agent’ h new endowments, is uniformly bounded away from zero, then our













This last transversality condition should not be confused with the usual exogenous transversality
constraint of models without default, which requires the deﬂated cost of any budget feasible portfolio
to go to zero. In fact, it is the sign property of the Lagrangian which allows us to dispense with
imposing the usual transversality constraint on all budget feasible portfolios.
5. Equilibrium Existence
The literature on equilibrium in default-free economies with inﬁnite-lived agents had to impose
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with nominal or numeraire single-period securities, and merely generic existence of equilibrium in
more general cases (see Hernandez and Santos (1996) or Magill and Quinzii (1996)).5 In fact, there
were three diﬃculties, but collateral avoids them and equilibrium always exists.
First, even for ﬁnite horizon economies and nominal or numeraire assets, when assets live several
periods, the rank of the returns matrix will depend on asset prices and, therefore, unless short-sales
are bounded, equilibrium existed, in the default-free model, only for a generic set of economies.
Collateral avoids this problem as the physical resources that can serve to collateralize the short-sales
(directly or indirectly through other assets) are ﬁnite. That is, collateral overcomes the problem,
just as it circumvented the price-dependence of the rank of the return matrices of real single-period
assets (see Geanakoplos and Zame (2002)).
Second, Ponzi schemes could occur (if debt or transversality restrictions were not imposed), but
collateral rules them out, as it did in the case of single-period assets (see Araujo, P´ ascoa and
Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002)). Actually, it is the non-negativity of the returns of the joint operation of
constituting collateral and short-selling (i.e., the sign property of the Lagrangian discussed in the
previous section) that takes care of this problem.6
Third, as Hernandez and Santos (1996) pointed out, when asset return matrices are not bounded
along the event-tree, equilibria might not exist when inﬁnite-lived real (or numeraire) assets are in
zero net supply. In fact, the asset price can be shown to be the series of discounted real returns
and would be unbounded, unless marginal rates of substitution tend to zero quickly enough (which
would be the case if the asset’s net supply were positive, inducing unbounded additional resources).
Collateral dispenses with any uniform bounds on assets’ promised returns, as the asset price is
bounded by the discounted value of the depreciated collateral at the next date, plus perhaps some
shadow price of the collateral constraint (see Proposition 2 below).
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions A to D there exists an equilibrium.
Sketch of Proof: The proof follows along the lines of the existence argument for single-period
assets in Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) (see Appendix D for all the details). Existence
for ﬁnite horizon economies is established, given that collateral requirements bound feasible short-
sales. By a diagonalization argument, the sequence of ﬁnite horizon equilibrium variables and
associated Lagrange multipliers has a subsequence that converges at every node. The cluster point
satisﬁes individual optimality since it veriﬁes the Euler and transversality conditions of Proposition
1 above.
5Hernandez and Santos (1996) were also able to show the existence of equilibrium in the special case where the
asset structure consists of a single inﬁnite lived real asset in positive net supply.
6In the presence of utility penalties, this sign property is lost and Ponzi schemes may occur (see P´ ascoa and Seghir
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6. Asset Pricing Properties
In this section we will characterize prices which give a ﬁnite optimum to the agents’ problems.
We refer to those prices as optimality-compatible. Of course, it follows from Assumption D that
equilibrium prices are always optimality-compatible.
We will treat commodities as if they were assets, because their durability allows us to regard
them as Lucas’ trees; that is, as rights to beneﬁt from part of it through current consumption, as
well as rights to sell its depreciated values in future states of nature.
The following result, which is a consequence of the Euler conditions, asserts that optimality-
compatible asset prices can be decomposed in terms of the deﬂated value of their future deliveries,
accrued by the shadow prices of the ﬁnancial constraints, and non-pecuniary returns, that reﬂect
the utility gains from autonomous consumption or from consumption of physical collateral.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions B and D, for each process (p,q) ∈ P of optimality-compatible
prices, there exist, at each node ξ, strictly positive deﬂators γξ, non-negative shadow price vectors








γµDµ(p,q) + ηθ(ξ); (8)
γξ(CVξ,j(p,q) − qξ,j) =
X
µ∈ξ+
γµ (DCVµ,j(p,q) − Dµ,j(p,q)) (9)
+αξ · CP
ξ,j(p,q) + ηϕ(ξ,j).
Moreover, the shadow prices of the sign constraints on the long and short positions of asset j,
(ηθ(ξ,j), ηϕ(ξ,j)), are equal to zero when the shadow prices ηx(ξ,l) are zero, for the commodities
that serve as collateral (directly baking asset j or indirectly, by baking its ﬁnancial collateral).
It follows that, although asset prices can be non-linear functions of their future eﬀective payments,
the non-linearities can only arise as a consequence of binding physical collateral constraints (more
precisely, when the shadow prices ηx of these constraints are strictly positive). In fact, in any
equilibrium in which at least one agent made autonomous consumption in those commodities that
are used as physical collateral (i.e. this agent has zero sign multipliers for consumption), asset
prices satisfy the following (generalized) martingale property: There exists a plan of strictly positive






Dµ,j(p,q), ∀(ξ,j) ∈ D × J.
Remark 3. In the context of a two-period economy with physical collateral only, Araujo, Fajardo
and P´ ascoa (2005) had already obtained the same asset pricing conditions as non-arbitrage condi-
tions. In fact, just like in Araujo, Fajardo and P´ ascoa (2005), prices satisfy the conditions (7), (8)
and (9) of Proposition 2, if and only if, there do not exist non-negative plans (xξ,θξ,ϕξ)ξ∈D giving14 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
with certainty, at each node, either positive returns or an improvement of the utility, without any
cost. That is, if and only if, at each node ξ ∈ D, the following conditions can not hold with at least
one as a strict inequality,
pξxξ + CVξ(p,q)ϕξ + qξ (θξ − ϕξ) ≤ 0; (11)





ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) ϕξ,j ≥ 0. (13)
Existence of deﬂators and deviations from linearity could be established, as in Araujo, Fajardo
and P´ ascoa (2005), using a theorem on separation of convex cones.
As ﬁnancial markets can be incomplete, the processes of deﬂators and deviations from linearity
that satisfy conditions (7), (8) and (9) above will not be necessarily unique. Thus, we denote by
Γ any arbitrary plan of deﬂators, shadow prices and non-pecuniary returns that satisfy pricing
conditions of Proposition 2, and we refer to it as a process of valuation coeﬃcients, compatible
with prices (p,q). A process of valuation coeﬃcients in which deﬂators are given by Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers of agent h will be denoted by Γh.
Finally, it follows from the above pricing formulas that, at each node ξ, the ﬁnancial “haircut”
on asset j (i.e. the diﬀerence between the collateral cost and the asset price) must be non-negative.
Although this diﬀerence may be equal to zero (contrarily to the case where there is only physical
collateral, see Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Mart´ ınez (2002)), it follows from equation (9) that the
ﬁnancial haircut is strictly positive when the asset is directly backed by physical collateral. Thus,
optimality-compatible prices satisfy,
(14) CVξ,j(p,q) ≥ qξ,j, ∀j ∈ J,
with a strictly inequality when CP
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) 6= 0.
These last inequalities, jointly with asset pricing properties of Proposition 2, will be fundamental
for obtaining conditions which characterize the existence of speculative bubbles in the prices of
assets subject to default.
7. Fundamental Values and Speculative Bubbles in Prices
The existence of speculative bubbles in non-arbitrage prices was studied, among others, by Magill
and Quinzii (1996) and Santos and Woodford (1997), in the case where agents can not default and
where short sales satisfy debt restrictions or exogenous transversality conditions. As in their work,
speculation is deﬁned as a deviation of the equilibrium price from the fundamental value of the
asset, which is the deﬂated value of future payments and services that an asset yields.
Speculation in durable goods. As under incomplete markets, the process of valuation coeﬃcients is
not unique, we deﬁne the fundamental value of a commodity, at a node ξ, as a function of the chosen
vector of valuation coeﬃcients.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 15
Note that, although commodities can be durable, their do not generate any payments along the
event-tree. Thus, the fundamental value, at ξ, of a good l ∈ L only takes into account the deﬂated
value of the rental services that one unit of this commodity generates in D(ξ). Now, given prices
(p,q) ∈ P and a process of valuation coeﬃcients Γ, the rental services, deﬂated to node ξ, that a












As one unit of commodity l at ξ is transforming itself into a bundle Yξ,µ(·, l) at µ, the fundamental




















(αµ + ηx(µ)) Yξ,µ(·, l),
where the last equality follows from pricing condition (7) of Proposition 2. Note that, in case of a
non-diagonal depreciation matrix, the fundamental value of l will take into account the utility gains
αµ,l0, associated with another commodity l0. Actually, in this case the depreciation matrix trans-
forms commodities into other goods and can be interpreted as an exogenous production technology.
Definition 2. Given a process Γ of valuation coeﬃcients, we say that a commodity l ∈ L has a
Γ-bubble at node ξ when the price diﬀers from the fundamental value, i.e. pξ,l 6= Fl(ξ,p,q,Γ).












As the last term, on the right hand side of the equation above, is non-negative, it follows that the
fundamental value of commodity l is well deﬁned, independently of the chosen valuation coeﬃcients
Γ. Moreover, that same term is bounded by the price pξ,l, and, taking the limit as T goes to inﬁnity,
we obtain,







Hence, the price of a commodity is greater or equal to the fundamental value. Furthermore, a







pµYξ,µ(·, l) = 0.
Thus, a commodity l that has ﬁnite durability at a node ξ (i.e. there exists N > 0 such that
Yξ,µ(·, l) = 0 for all µ with t(µ) > t(ξ) + N) is free of bubbles. For commodities with inﬁnite
durability, the following results give suﬃcient conditions for the absence of bubbles,16 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Theorem 2. Given equilibrium prices (p,q) ∈ P, suppose that Assumptions C and D hold. When
markets are complete, commodities are free of bubbles in D. With incomplete markets, if there










then commodities are free of Γ-bubbles in D(ξ).















Taking the limit as T goes to inﬁnity, we conclude the proof of this case.
In the complete markets case, transversality conditions (TCx), (TCϕ) and (TCθ) hold, for all
agents and for a same deﬂator Γ. Adding up these three conditions across all agents, we get condi-
tion (17) for the deﬂator Γ and for each agent, at node ξ0. Thus, we assures the absence of Γ-bubbles
in D. 
The above suﬃcient condition, for the absence of bubbles in commodities, holds when the present








Theorem 3. Given equilibrium prices (p,q) ∈ P, suppose that Assumptions C-D hold and that
agent h’s new endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero in D(ξ) (that is there exists an
lower bound w  0 such that wh
µ ≥ w, for each µ > ξ). If cumulated depreciation factors Yξ,µ are
uniformly bounded by above along the event-tree D(ξ), then Γh-bubbles are ruled out in commodities
in D(ξ).
Proof. This follows from equation (16) and item (iii) in Proposition 1. 
Alternatively, to avoid Γh bubbles in commodity prices, we could have assumed new endow-
ments of agent h in D(ξ) to be at least a ﬁxed proportion κ > 0 of her accumulated resources, i.e.
κWh
µ ≤ wh
µ for all µ ∈ D(ξ). That is, we could have required that new resources are not too small
relatively to cumulated past resources.
Bubbles in assets. The fundamental value of an asset is the present value of its future yields and
services. Future yields are the deliveries of perishable goods. Future services include the shadow
prices of the ﬁnancial constraints and the rental values of the delivered durable goods. These goods
can be directly delivered, as an original promise or a physical collateral garnishment, or received
indirectly, as a physical return associated with the ﬁnancial collateral garnishment.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 17
These real deliveries are unambiguously anticipated except in the borderline case, when the value
of the promise equals the garnishable collateral value. Thus, the fundamental value will depend not
just on the deﬂator compatible with non-arbitrage but also on the believed delivery rates for the
borderline nodes.
For a reason of simplicity, we start with and focus our analysis on the simplest case of assets
that are backed only by physical collateral, supposing that, in the borderline case, agents anticipate
that assets deliver the original promises. The general case will be studied in Appendix B.
In this context, given optimality-compatible prices (p,q), let Φ(ξ,j) ⊂ D(ξ) be the set of nodes
that can be reached from ξ following a path where asset j does not default, that is,
ν ∈ Φ(ξ,j) ⇔ pµAµ,j + qµ,j ≤ pµYµCP
µ−,j(pµ−,qµ−,j); ∀µ ∈ D : ξ < µ ≤ ν.
Moreover, let Ψ(ξ,j) be the set of successors of ξ in which asset j gives default, although promises
were honored at preceding successors of ξ, that is,
ν ∈ Ψ(ξ,j) ⇔
(
pνAν,j + qν,j > pνYνCP
ν−,j(pν−,qν−,j);
µ ∈ Φ(ξ,j), , ∀µ ∈ D : ξ < µ < ν..
By deﬁnition, at µ ∈ Φ(ξ,j), one unit of asset j’s gives yields and services equal to the fundamental
value of the delivery A(µ,j), that is,
P
l∈L Fl(µ,p,q,Γ)A(µ,j)l. Analogously, at a node µ in Ψ(ξ,j)




























where the last term in the right hand side of equation above is equal to zero, if physical collateral
constraints never bind in D(ξ) (see Proposition 2).
It follows that, in the particular case in which asset j does not default in any successor node of ξ













Definition 3. Given prices (p,q) ∈ P, we say that an asset j ∈ Λ0 is free of Γ-bubbles at a node ξ
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Theorem 4. Under Assumptions C and D, given equilibrium prices (p,q) ∈ P and any Γ, the
fundamental value of each asset j ∈ Λ0 is well deﬁned and satisﬁes qξ,j ≥ Fj(ξ,p,q,Γ). Moreover,
the following conditions are suﬃcient for the absence of Γ-bubbles in asset j at nodes µ ∈ D(ξ),







qµ,j = 0. (21)


















Now, at each node µ ∈ D(ξ) the price of commodities pµ,j can be split into a fundamental value,
Fl(µ,p,q,Γ), plus a non-negative bubble component, denoted by, bl(µ,p,q,Γ). Therefore, taking
the limit as T goes to inﬁnity, we obtain that,
























Thus, the fundamental value is less than or equal to the asset price. Moreover, when commodities
are free of bubbles at node ξ, are also free of bubbles in the event-tree D(ξ) and, therefore, when
condition (20) holds, bubbles are ruled out provided that condition (21) holds. 
Remark 4. Mortgage Loans. When asset j is a mortgage loan we have that CF
ξ,j = 0 and
CP
ξ,j = Yξ0,ξ CP
ξ0. Therefore, if the commodities that asset j promises to deliver or that are used as
collateral are free of Γ-bubbles in ξ, then Γ-bubbles are also ruled out in asset j. In fact, absence
of commodity bubbles in ξ implies that asset j has a Γ-bubble only if condition (21) does not hold,
but this is impossible, due the non-arbitrage condition (14) and the particular structure of collat-
eral requirements. Hence, a bubble in a mortgage loan is always a consequence of a bubble in a
commodity that is used as collateral or is part of the real promises.
The following corollary assures that, if all agents are not lenders at inﬁnity under a same deﬂator,
for which commodities are free of bubbles, then assets with persistent net supply are also free of
bubbles for this deﬂator. Suﬃcient conditions for absence of bubbles in commodity prices were given
by Theorems 2 and 3.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 19
Corollary 4.1 Consider an economy that satisﬁes Assumptions C and D. Given equilibrium prices









µ,j = 0, ∀h ∈ H.
Then, asset j ∈ Λ0 is free of Γ-bubbles in D(ξ) provided that its positive net supply is persistent.
Proof. By Theorem 4 it suﬃces to show that equation (21) holds. Now, let ej
µ be the total net






µ is uniformly bounded




















That is, bubbles are ruled out at ξ and, hence, also throughout D(ξ). 
Condition (22) should not be confused with the transversality condition (TCθ), which is nec-
essary for individual optimality and guarantees that, for personalized Kuhn-Tucker deﬂators, the
autonomous lending converges asymptotically to zero.
However, when markets are complete there is only one non-arbitrage deﬂator and ,therefore,
transversality conditions (TCx), (TCϕ) and (TCθ) imply that, even when the obligation of consti-
tuting ﬁnancial collateral makes agents become lenders at inﬁnity, bubbles in prices of assets can
arise only if the net supply is asymptotically zero (see Example 1) or actually zero beyond a certain
node.
Corollary 4.2 Suppose that, at equilibrium prices (p,q) ∈ P, there is only one non-arbitrage pro-
cess of valuation coeﬃcients in the event-tree D(ξ). Then any asset with persistent positive net
supply is free of bubbles at nodes µ ≥ ξ.
Proof. Denote by ej
µ the aggregate net supply of an asset j at nodes µ ≥ ξ. It follows from (TCx),

































Thus, asset k is free of bubbles, as commodities do not have bubbles in D(ξ) (see Theorem 2). The
absence of bubbles at successors of ξ also follows. 
Under incomplete markets, Kuhn-Tucker deﬂators can vary across agents and, therefore, the
transversality conditions (TCx), (TCϕ) and (TCθ) may not hold for all agents under a same plan of20 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
valuation coeﬃcients. Thus, even without bubbles in commodities, assets with persistent positive
net supply can have bubbles (see Example 2). Now, independently of the incompleteness of the
markets or the behavior of the positive net supply, when collateral requirements are bounded, we
can determine conditions on cumulated resources in order to assure that asset prices are equal to
fundamental values,
Corollary 4.3 Given equilibrium prices (p,q), suppose that Assumptions C and D hold and that
asset’ j ∈ Λ0 collateral requirements are uniformly bounded in D(ξ). (i) If there exists an agent h
which has cumulated physical endowments that are uniformly bounded away from zero in the sub-tree
D(ξ), and satisfying also condition (17) under Γ at ξ, then Γ-bubbles are ruled out in asset j at the
nodes µ ≥ ξ. (ii) Alternatively, Γh-bubbles are avoided in D(ξ), when the new endowments of agent
h are uniformly bounded away from zero, provided that there exists a matrix Y such that Yξ,µ ≤ Y ,
for each node µ > ξ.
Proof. Suppose that there exists C ∈ RL
+ such that CP
µ,j(pµ,qµ,j) ≤ C, for all µ > ξ. Now, by the















(i) Condition (17) guarantees that commodities are free of bubbles, and, when cumulated physical







pµ,l = 0, ∀l ∈ L,
which avoids bubbles in the price of j, due equation (23).
(ii) The upper bound in cumulated depreciation structures implies the asset j is free of bubbles, due
item (iii) in Proposition 1. 
Let us close this section with some remarks on a few novel aspects of the above concepts of
fundamental values and results on price bubbles.
1. Now, ﬁnitely-lived assets may have price bubbles too. In fact, the price of a ﬁnitely-lived asset
will have a bubble if the asset pays in durable goods whose prices have bubbles or if the asset defaults
and the surrendered physical or ﬁnancial collateral is subject to price bubbles. In a straightforward
extension of our model, we could have allowed for assets with ﬁnite life and show that price bubbles
would occur if the inﬁnitely-lived commodities or assets serving as collateral are priced at inﬁnity
(see Appendix B, for the general case allowing for ﬁnancial collateral).
2. Coming back to a question raised by Santos and Woodford (1997), there seems to exist now
a relation between asset price bubbles and the more abstract concept of price bubble proposed
by Gilles and Le Roy (1992), in the Arrow-Debreu contingent claims set up, in terms of the non-
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in models without default, as the summability of the deﬂated commodity price sequence implied
absence of price bubbles only in the case assets in positive net supply (as noticed by Magill and
Quinzii (1996)). Now, when assets are allowed to default but are backed by bounded collateral
requirements, if the deﬂated commodity price sequence is summable, then assets are free of price
bubbles for this deﬂator.
8. Examples of Monetary Equilibria
In this section we consider an asset, money, that promises zero real returns. As any other asset
in the model, money can be short-sold provided that collateral requirements are met. In other
words, consumers may use money loans to ﬁnance the purchase of a durable bundle that has to be
surrendered if they default on these loans. In addition, there may be endowments of money at the
initial node. The endowment of money should be seen as a holding of a contract that, due to an
institutional arrangement, some privileged agents can sell to ﬁnance themselves, or as money that
was brought into this economy at the initial node but was generated elsewhere precisely in the same
way as collateralized short-sales are done here.7
We do not attempt to model the role of money as a medium of exchange. There is an extensive
literature, dating back to Clower (1967), that explains why money may be used instead of a credit
system that enables agents to purchase goods before selling their own. Such a credit system might
require perfect record keeping of past transactions to evaluate the ability of those receiving credit to
repay (see Ostroy (1973)). This literature has progressed along two lines: the general equilibrium
models with cash-in-advance constraints and the models with randomly matched agents, where
cash is a substitute for memorizing bilateral imbalances (as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and
Kocherlakota (1998)). Our secured credit approach and the liquidity approach can be seen as
opposite ideal representations of economies where credit is used in many, but not all, transactions
and not all credit is secured. However, even in secured credit economies, where agents need to keep
record of credit given only at immediately preceding dates,8 money may have a positive price as a
result of the incompleteness of credit markets.
Now, collateralizing does not imply convertibility. In fact, the price of money is not pegged to the
price of the collateral goods except in borderline equilibria, where qξ = pξYξCξ−. Even in this case,
the apparent convertibility is an endogenous property that may happen to prevail in equilibrium,
rather than an institutional arrangement, and the analogy with the gold standard situation does
not carry through completely for another reason: short-sales of convertible currencies do not require
traders to purchase the equivalent gold bundle, but, in our default model, short-sales of money
always require the purchase of the collateral bundle. Alternatively, short-sales could be rethought
as being in fact an additional issue by non-privileged agents required to constitute gold reserves.
7This cashless, pure credit, environment, where all transactions may be ﬁnanced by money loans, may portray an
ideal world to which modern credit economies seem to be converging, and has also been an appealing abstraction to
some monetary theorists, both in the past (see Wicksell (1898)) and recently (see Woodford (2003)).
8If default had other penalties besides collateral repossession, such as utility penalties, the price-dependent default
rule common to all agents would be replaced by subjective default criteria and cash payments would become a valuable
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However, convertibility would again fail outside of the borderline case. Collateralizing implies only
that depreciated collateral values become a ceiling to the price of money and, therefore, the positivity
of the price of money is still quite an intriguing issue.9
We present two examples of monetary equilibrium in which the fragile features of previous ex-
amples in the literature are avoided, as the present value of wealth is ﬁnite and ﬁnancial constraints
are non-binding. In the ﬁrst example, the introduction of money completes the markets and it is
a borderline case equilibrium, with an asymptotically zero money supply; in the second example,
money reduces but does not eliminate market incompleteness, but there is a persistent money sup-
ply.10
Example 1. Consider a deterministic economy with two inﬁnite lived agents, h ∈ {1,2}, one
durable good and one long lived asset, money. There are asset endowments, eh, only at the original
date. Physical endowments are given by wh
t . Let ˆ xh
t be the consumption choices of agent h. Agents
preferences are given by





where β ∈ (0,1). We take the commodity as the numeraire. The physical collateral coeﬃcient at
date t is Ct = 1, and the commodity depreciation rate is also constant, given by κ ∈ (0,1). Denote
agent h portfolio by zh
t . At each date t > 0, the asset’s eﬀective nominal return is Rt = min{qt,κ}.
We can write Rt = (1 − λt)κ + λt qt, where the delivery rate satisﬁes λt = 1 if κ > qt and λt = 0 if
κ < qt.
The collateral constraint can be written as ˆ xh
t ≥ −zh
t and the budget constraints, for a non-
negative plan (ˆ xh









t + κˆ xh
t−1 + Rtzh
t−1, for t > 0.







































t−1, for t > 0.
We look for an equilibrium without default (that is, where qt ≤ κ, for all t > 0) and with
non-binding collateral constraints. By Proposition 1, a budget feasible plan (ˆ xh
t ,zh
t )t≥0 is optimal
9Borderline equilibria might be regarded instead as implementing an interest rate property. In the simplest
case, where depreciation and collateral coeﬃcients are constant, the nominal interest rate matches the inﬂation rate
computed using the collateral requirements as reference bundle.
10Santos and Woodford (1997) had already remarked that an asymptotically zero net supply to an inﬁnitely-lived
private sector could accommodate bubbles, as in the ”hyperdeﬂationary” equibrium by Woodford (1994). We show
that collateral introduces an endogenous mechanism that allows for the net supply to become asymptotically zero
and that, under incomplete markets, robust occurrence of bubbles does not require the net supply to vanish.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 23
for agent h if there exist non-negative multipliers γh
t such that, the following Euler equations and
transversality conditions hold,11
γh














t (x) = βt√
x.
Now, let δ = β2 and take κ ∈ (δ
2,δ). Suppose that individual endowments are given by,
wh
0 = 1 + (−1)h+1κs0,
wh
t = δt − κδt−1 − κα(1 − α)t−1(eh + (−1)h+1s0), ∀t > 0,

























Let us compute an equilibrium. Let, for all t ≥ 0, γh
t = 1
2(1−κ) and qt = κ. We argue that the
consumption plan xh
t = δt can be implemented in equilibrium. In fact, we have that (uh
t )0(δt) = 0.5
and, therefore, Euler equations (24) and (25) are satisﬁed. Moreover, as Rt = κ, budget restrictions
reduce to zh
0 = (−1)h+1s0 + eh and zh
t = −α(1 − α)t−1(eh + (−1)h+1s0) + zh
t−1, for t ≥ 1.
Hence, budget restrictions hold for zh
t = (1−α)t ((−1)h+1s0+eh). As consumption and portfolio
plans tend to zero, but deﬂators and prices are constant, transversality conditions hold. Moreover,
the restrictions on the parameters of the economy imply that collateral constraints are not binding.
Therefore, given prices (pt,qt) = (1,κ), the plan (xh
t ,zh
t ) = (δt, (1 − α)t ((−1)h+1s0 + eh)) is an
optimal choice for agent h. Clearly, money net supply is asymptotically zero.
Note that asset is in borderline case for each t ≥ 1 and, if we take the equilibrium delivery rate λt
to be equal to 1−α, then all market clearing conditions hold at each date. Now, commodity prices do






ptYt,T = limT→+∞ κT−t = 0. Moreover, as
collateral constraints are not binding, the respective shadow prices are zero and, therefore, if agents
believe that in the borderline case the asset pays the original promise, it follows from equation (19)
that the fundamental value of money at date t is zero and, as qt > 0, money has a bubble at each
date.
As argued in the previous section, the above belief about the deliveries may diverge from the
equilibrium delivery rates. When an agent evaluates whether there is speculation or not in an asset,
the agent is concerned with values and therefore it is perfectly reasonable to anticipate full delivery
in borderline situations, as the computation becomes much simpler. But other beliefs should also be
allowed and the above monetary equilibrium may be reinterpreted as a positive fundamental value
for some beliefs (or even as a situation where bubbles and positive fundamental values coexist).
11Notice that the Euler equations with respect to ˆ xh
t and zh
t , conditions (24) and (25), imply the Euler conditions
(EE), with respect to (xh
t ,θh
t ,ϕh
t ).24 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
In fact, it follows from equation (B.3) (see Appendix B) that the fundamental value at date t,


















which implies that the asset has a bubble at date t if and only if
Q
t<s≤T τs converges to a strictly
positive limit as T goes to inﬁnity.
Thus, when the limit above is strictly positive and less than one, the asset has a bubble, although
the fundamental value is positive. Notice that, in this example, monetary equilibria can be inter-
preted as a positive fundamental value even though shadow prices of the collateral constraints are
zero. 
In the incomplete markets case, the diversity of agents’ deﬂators allows for price bubbles, even
with persistent positive net supply (as collateral is not surrendered).
Example 2. Consider a stochastic economy where each node ξ ∈ D has two successors: ξ+ =
{ξu, ξd}. There are two agents h ∈ H = {1,2}, who trade two commodities and a single asset.
The ﬁrst commodity is a perishable good x and the second one is a durable good y subject to
a constant rate of depreciation κ ∈ (0,1). The asset, money, is subject to default and backed
by constant physical collateral requirements, Cξ = (0,2). Each agent h has physical endowments
(wh
ξ,x, wh
ξ,y)ξ∈D, ﬁnancial endowments eh ≥ 0, at the ﬁrst node, and utility given by,










where β ∈ (0,1) and ρh(ξ) ∈ (0,1) satisﬁes ρh(ξ) = ρh(ξd) + ρh(ξu) and, for each t ≥ 0,
P











Let Ddu be the set of nodes attained after going down followed by up, that is, Ddu = {κ ∈ D :
∃ξ, t(κ) = t(ξ) + 2 ∧ κ = (ξd)u } and let Dud be the set of nodes reached by going up and then
down, that is, Dud = {κ ∈ D : ∃ξ, t(κ) = t(ξ) + 2 ∧ κ = (ξu)d }.
Suppose that agent h = 1 is the only one endowed with the asset, i.e. (e1,e2) = (e,0) and that
agent’ h physical endowments at initial node are wh
ξ),x = wh
ξ0,y = 1. Moreover, for each ξ > ξ0,
deﬁne wh
ξ,y = δt(ξ) − κδt(ξ)−1 and wh












2(1−κ)β−t(ξ) , ifξ ∈ {ξd
0} ∪ Dud;
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Notice that the cumulated endowments of the durable good are tending to zero at the rate δ = β2
and, therefore, given the speciﬁc form of the marginal utility, the scarcity of this commodity tends
to oﬀset the discount factor and, in equilibrium, each agent should consume the own cumulated
endowment. But the shocks on endowments of the perishable good create an opportunity to use
money as a way to transfer wealth to states that are more valuable.
In fact, let prices be (pξ,x,pξ,y,qξ)ξ∈D = (2(1−κ)βt(ξ), 1, κ)ξ∈D. For these prices, default never
occurs (as qξ = κ < 2κ = pξYξCξ−). Now, as the price of money is stationary and the price of the
perishable good is falling at a rate equal to the discount factor, the decision on whether to consume
the endowment shocks or save, will depend only on conditional probabilities. Since agents receive
positive shocks in states that are assigned low probabilities, there is an incentive to use these positive
shocks to buy money and sell it later in states with higher probabilities. Thus, we will look for an
equilibrium where agent 1, the one that starts endowed with money, gets rid of it when going down
(to which she attaches a higher conditional probability), but, if afterwards she goes up, she will use
the positive perishable endowment shock to buy back money (and be back in a ﬁnancial position
analogous to the one she had at the original node). Clearly, each agent should end up consuming
the other agent’s positive shock.




ξ , δt(ξ)), where h 6= h0. As












































h = 2 ∧ ξ ∈ D
du
;
0, in other case.
Therefore, the consumption allocations (ˆ xh
ξ, ˆ yh
ξ) = (1 + dh
0





ξ) = (e, e, 0, 0) and (θ2
ξ, ϕ2
ξ) = (e − θ1
ξ, 0) are budget feasible, because
there are no short sales, which assures that collateral constraints are never binding. Moreover,
market clearing also holds. It remains to guarantee individual optimality.
For this purpose, it suﬃces (by Proposition 1) to ﬁnd non-negative multipliers (γh
ξ )ξ∈D such that
the following Euler equations,
γh
















ξ qξ = γh
ξuqξu + γh
ξdqξd















η −→ 0, as T → +∞
hold. However, as u0
ξ,x(1 + dh
0
ξ , δt(ξ)) = βt(ξ)ρh(ξ) and u0
ξ,y(1 + dh
0
ξ , δt(ξ)) =
ρ
h(ξ)
2 , if we chose
γh
ξ = ρh(ξ) 1
2(1−κ), we guarantee Euler equations hold. It is easy (see Appendix C) to show that
transversality conditions above hold for both agents. Thus, we have found an equilibrium.26 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
In equilibrium, money has an unambiguous bubble. In fact, the price of money is always strictly
less than the value of the depreciated collateral (default or the borderline case never occur) and
collateral constraints never bind (which implies that shadow prices of ﬁnancial constraints are zero).
Finally, as expected (see Corollary 4.1), agents can not agree in not lending at inﬁnity under a
same process of multipliers (γh
ξ )ξ∈D. For instance, agent h = 1 is a lender at inﬁnity when future is





















> 0, as T → +∞. 
Notice that both agents perceive ﬁnite present values of aggregate wealth. In fact, aggregated
endowments up to node ξ are Wξ = W1
ξ + W2
ξ = (2 +
P
h dh
ξ, 2δt(ξ)) and, therefore, given ξ ∈ D,

















































































We close this section with some comments relating the examples to the results by Santos and
Woodford (1997).
1. In both examples, uniform impatience, deﬁned by these authors as a joint requirement on
endowments and preferences, fails. If endowments were uniformly bounded from below, then a
recursive stationary utility would meet this requirement. This is not the case in the examples.12
Given any consumption plan and any node, it is not possible to ﬁnd a uniform coeﬃcient σ ∈ [0,1)
such that: adding to current consumption the current aggregate resources can compensate for
multiplying future consumption by σ (as required in deﬁnition of uniformly patience given after
12As Levine and Zame (1996) point out, endowments can be made bounded from above or from below by re-scaling
the variables, but then utility would no longer be stationary.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 27
Assumption D). The coeﬃcient σ can not be uniformly (across all nodes) bounded away from one,
as aggregate endowments tend to zero.13
It was already known (see Santos and Woodford (1997)) that, in the model without default and
under market incompleteness, the lack of uniform impatience could create price bubbles for assets in
positive net supply and for deﬂators with ﬁnite present value of aggregate wealth. Let us compare
with what happens in both examples. In the ﬁrst one, markets became complete but bubbles can not
be ruled out for such a deﬂator, since the asset’s positive net supply converges endogenously to zero.
The second example may look less surprising, as it portrays an incomplete markets equilibrium in
the absence of uniform impatience, but it should be noted that non-uniform impatience is allowed
by the general conditions for existence of equilibrium in economies with secured assets, whereas
this was not the case in the default-free world. It was only in the very special case that borrowing
constraints forbade short-sales that examples could be computed, as Ponzi schemes were absent.
In Example 2, collateral constraints are not binding and one might try to infer, from the default-
free results, that, in this case, the positive price of money is not robust to adding new assets
(assuming the constraints would remain unbinding). However, this can not be infered. Let us recall
ﬁrst the argument for default-free economies. According to Theorem 3.1 in Santos and Woodford
(1997), if the supremum, over all state-price processes, of the present values of aggregate wealth
is ﬁnite, then, for any equilibrium, assets in positive net supply would be free of bubbles for one
of these processes. The hypothesis would be satisﬁed by adding suﬃciently productive assets, so
that a portfolio could be found at the initial date which, if maintained throughout the event-tree
(possibly allowing for exogenous asset conversion), would be capable of super-replicating aggregate
endowments at every node (see Santos and Woodford (1997), Lemma 2.4). The thesis would allow,
in the case of equilibrium without binding borrowing constraints (and hence a zero fundamental
value), to infer that money should have a zero price.
In the collateral model, an analogous theorem could be established, but the hypothesis could not
be guaranteed by adding assets, since the eﬀective real returns from a date 0 portfolio are price-
dependent (in other words, the conversion of the asset into its depreciated collateral is endogenous)
and, once default occurs, future returns fall at the depreciation rate κ, whereas aggregate endow-
ments of the durable good are given by 2δt, where δ ≥ κ. That is, super-replication of aggregate
wealth is always default-dependent, depends on equilibrium prices and can not be guaranteed by
assumption. Hence, once we allow for default, it is no longer possible to claim the existence of
an asset return structure that can always super-replicate aggregate endowments, so that present
values of aggregate wealth become ﬁnite for every non-arbitrage deﬂator. This opens more room
for asset price bubbles. Moreover, bubbles may also occur in the prices of durable goods, under
market incompleteness (as condition (17) fails in Theorem 2), and mortgage loans become subject
to speculation, injected by speculation on the collateral (see Remark 4, Section 7).
13In Example 2 the aggregate resources at node ξ, at equilibrium prices, are just equal to
P
h Wh
ξ , whereas in





s=1 κt−s (ακ) (1 − α)s−1 P
h eh, where
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Notice that the robustness of the money bubble might depend instead on the relative spanning
roles of money and the additional assets being added to the economy. If the degree of market in-
completeness is not too small, money might still be essential.
2. Actually, the second example could be reformulated replacing the collateral constraint by
a no short-sales restriction. The equilibrium that we computed is also an equilibrium for that
reformulated example: the Euler and transversality conditions are still suﬃcient for individual
optimality (since the Lagrangian function enjoys also the sign property discussed in Section 4 if
short-sales are forbidden). This reformulated example illustrates the role of uniform impatience
in Theorem 3.3 in Santos and Woodford (1997): without it bubbles occur for deﬂators with ﬁnite
present value of aggregate wealth. Notice that short-sale constraints are binding and might remain
so if other assets were added.
If this reformulated example were integrated in a traditional model where all the other assets
could not default, we could make all deﬂators yield ﬁnite present values of aggregate wealth (by
adding assets), but, if the short-sale constraints remained binding at some nodes, it would not be
possible to claim that the price of money should become zero.
Suppose instead that the reformulated example were integrated in the collateral model, allowing
for an outside money (high powered money endowed by some agent), that can not be short-sold,
to coexist with collateralized assets (possibly including an inside money, in zero net supply, with
collateral or reserve requirements in terms of outside money). Then, binding short-sale constraints
and default by other assets would constitute two possible reasons for the non-fragility of the positive
price of outside money (and bubbles could pass to assets secured by outside money, if those assets
defaulted (see Section 7)).
9. Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that collateral allows for robust cases of price bubbles in assets in positive net
supply. This class of assets is quite important, as it includes equity contracts and money. Our
examples focus precisely on the latter and in a context without any liquidity frictions. Hence, in
these examples, bubbles have the intriguing feature of assigning a positive price to an asset having no
dividends and also providing no services. In our examples, there are no binding collateral constraints
and the monetary equilibria are either (i) bubbles that can be reinterpreted as positive fundamental
values due to collateral repossession or (ii) unambiguous money bubbles.
The former occur under an endogenous reduction in assets’ net supply, as the collateral takes the
place of the promise, and are a new instance for the long standing view on the eﬃciency properties
resulting from a vanishing money supply (see Friedman (1969), Grandmont and Youn´ es (1972, 1973)
or Woodford (1994), among others). The latter are compatible with persistent money supply, but
can only occur in the incomplete markets case, by taking advantage of the diversity in agents’
personalized deﬂators.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 29
Appendix A
Proof of Claims in Remark 1. It follows from the deﬁnition of the sets Λk that, ˙ S
k≥0Λk ⊂ J. Thus,
suppose that there exists j ∈ J such that j / ∈ ˙ S
k≥0Λk. In this situation, j / ∈ Λ0 and, therefore, it follows
from Assumption A, that there exists j1 ∈ J such that, for each node ξ, (C
F
ξ,j)j1 6= 0. If j1 ∈ ˙ S
k≥0Λk then
asset j is an element of ˙ S
k≥0Λk too, a contradiction. Hence, {j1,j2} / ∈ ˙ S
k≥0Λk.




for each r ≥ 1. As #J < +∞, this contradicts Assumption B. Therefore, J = ˙ S
k≥0Λk. Also, by deﬁnition,
if Λk = ∅ then Λk+1 = ∅. So, if Λk 6= ∅, then Λk−1 6= ∅, which implies that Λ0 6= ∅. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let ∂v
h
ξ(zξ) be the super-diﬀerential set of the function v
h


















































ξ(p,q) := (pξ, qξ, CVξ(p,q) − qξ ) (A.4)
∇2 g
h
ξ(p,q) := −(pξYξ, Dξ(p,q), DCVξ(p,q) − Dξ(p,q)) (A.5)
As for each asset j ∈ J short sales eﬀective returns Dξ,j(p,q) are not greater than the respective garnish-
able collateral values, the joint returns from actions taken at immediately preceding nodes are non-negative










(i) Necessity of transversality condition and Euler equations. Suppose that the plan (z
h
ξ )ξ∈D is optimal for



















≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T,
zξ = (xξ,θξ,ϕξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T.
It follows from Assumption D and the optimality of (z
h
ξ )ξ∈D that each truncated problem has a solution
(z
h,T
ξ )ξ∈DT . In fact, if for some T ∈ N, the truncated problem (P
h,T) does not have a solution, then there











ξ ϕξ(k)) →k→+∞ +∞.








ξ ϕξ(k)), which contradicts the optimality of
(z
h
ξ )ξ∈D, because the plan (˜ zξ)ξ∈D deﬁned by ˜ zξ = zξ(k), for each ξ ∈ D
T, and by ˜ zξ = 0 other wise, is
budget feasible and improves the utility level of agent h.
Moreover, there exist non-negative multipliers (γ
h,T
ξ )ξ∈DT such that, the following saddle point property




























ξ− ;p,q) = 0.
Claim A1. For each ξ ∈ D and for all T ≥ t(ξ),










where, by Assumption C, W
h
ξ := minl∈L W
h
ξ,l > 0, and ||pξ||Σ > 0, as a consequence of monotonicity of u
h
ξ
in the ﬁrst coordinate. Therefore, for each ξ ∈ D, the sequence (γ
h,T
ξ )T≥t(ξ) is bounded.





ξ ,0,0), ∀ξ ∈ D
t−1,

















ξ ) ≤ U
h(ˆ x
h).
As Assumption C guarantees that, for each ξ ∈ D, W
h
ξ := minl∈L W
h
ξ,l > 0, the result follows. 


























ξ− ;p,q) = 0, for all ξ ∈ D
T,








ξ ;p,q) ≤ U
h(ˆ x
h).





ξ , ∀ξ ∈ D
t−1,
0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T \ D
t−1,
by budget feasibility of allocation (z
h









































This concludes the proof, because the left hand side term, in the inequality above, is non-negative. 
Claim A3. For each ξ ∈ D





































µ, ∀µ 6= ξ,
y, for µ = ξ ,BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 31






























Now, as the function g
h
ξ(·;p,q) is aﬃne and the plan (z
h
ξ )ξ∈D ∈ B











































Substituting the right hand side of equations above in equation (A.11) we conclude the proof. 
The proof of the necessity of (EE1)-(EE2) and (TC) is now a direct consequence of the claims above:
Claim A1 guarantees that, node by node, the sequence (γ
h,T
ξ )T≥t(ξ) is bounded. Therefore, as the event-
tree is countable, Tychonoﬀ Theorem assures the existence of a common subsequence (Tk)k∈N ⊂ N and
non-negative multipliers (γ
h
























ξ− = 0, (A.13)
where equation (A.12) follows from the strictly monotonicity of u
h
ξ in the ﬁrst commodity, and equation
(A.13) is a consequence of Claim A2 (taking ﬁrst, the limit as T goes to inﬁnity in equation (A.8) and,
afterwards, the limit in t). Moreover, taking the limit as T goes to inﬁnity in (A.10) we obtain that, for






























































+) = 0, when z ≥ 0
and δ(z,R
L
+) = −∞, in other case. Notice that, for each z ≥ 0, κ ∈ ∂δ(z) ⇔ 0 ≤ k(y − z), ∀y ≥ 0.










such that both v
0




ξ − ˜ v
0
ξ) · z = 0. Thus, it follows from equation (A.14) that there exists, for
































































ξ ;p,q). Therefore, there exists, for












ξ ;p,q) of super-gradients, such that Euler conditions hold.32 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ










































0. As utility functions u
h
ξ are strictly increasing in the ﬁrst argument, we know that ˜ v
0
ξ has a strictly positive
ﬁrst coordinate. Thus, we have that pξ,1γ
h
ξ > 0, which implies that the multipliers γ
h
ξ are strictly positive,
for each ξ ∈ D.
(ii) Suﬃciency of transversality condition and Euler equations. It follows from equations (EE1) and (EE2)
























ξ,1 · (zξ − z
h
ξ ).
























ξ,1 · (zξ − z
h
ξ ).


























µ,2 · zµ− ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the sign property L
0
µ,2 ≥ 0, satisﬁed at each node of the event-tree.







ξ(ˆ xξ) = U
h(ˆ x) ≤ U
h(ˆ x
h),
which guarantees that the allocation (z
h
ξ )ξ∈D is optimal.
(iii) Summability of individual endowments. As we pointed out in inequality (A.16), the existence of multi-
pliers (γ
h

















































ξ < +∞. 
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Therefore, as deﬂated endowments are summable, using Euler conditions we assure that our transversality












This concludes the proof. 










































ξ, it follows that the transversality conditions (TCx), (TCθ) and

















Proof of Proposition 2. As prices (p,q) ∈ P give a ﬁnite optimum to agents problems, if we denote
by (z
h
ξ )ξ∈D the optimal plan of agent h at prices (p,q), it follows from Proposition 1 that there exist non-
negative multipliers (γ
h










































ξ,2 = −γ ∇2 g
h
ξ(p,q). (A.18)








µ,2 ∈ Z, (A.19)




















we obtain pricing equations (7), (8) and (9), as the super gradients of u
h
ξ are vectors with strictly positive
entries.
Moreover, multiplying equation (7) by the physical collateral requirement of asset j and adding equation

















Therefore, if j ∈ Λ0 and the shadow prices ηx(ξ,l) are zero, for the commodities that serve as col-
lateral for asset j, then ηx(ξ)C
P
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) = 0. Thus, the non-negativity of shadow prices implies that
(ηθ(ξ,j),ηϕ(ξ,j)) = 0. Analogously, if j ∈ Λk, with k > 0, and the shadow prices ηx(ξ,l) of those commodi-
ties that serve as physical collateral (directly or indirectly, via other assets in previous layers of the pyramid-
ing structure) are zero, then a recursive argument assures that ηx(ξ)C
P
ξ,j(pξ,qξ,j) = 0 and ηθ(ξ)C
F
ξ,j(qξ) = 0,
which implies that (ηθ(ξ,j),ηϕ(ξ,j)) = 0. 34 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Appendix B. Bubbles in Assets. The general case.
As mentioned in Section 7, the deﬁnition of the fundamental value of an asset depends not only on the
process of valuation coeﬃcients, but also on believed delivery rates if the borderline case occurs. Just as
there is no reason to pick as a process of valuation coeﬃcients the Kuhn-Tucker deﬂators of a particular
agent, instead of any other compatible with non-arbitrage conditions, there is also no reason to pick the
equilibrium delivery rates instead of any other rates that may treat diﬀerently the deliveries only in the
borderline case. For purposes of valuation, anticipating that agents pay the promise or anticipating that they
surrender the collateral (or a convex combination of the two) are equally perfectly acceptable when agents
are indiﬀerent between these two actions. Recall that each agent does not care about this choice and does
not know what are the other agents’ choices. Thus, given equilibrium prices (p,q) we deﬁne fundamental
values in terms of any believed delivery rates compatible with individual rationality, that is, any process




1 if pξA(ξ,j) + qξ,j < DCVξ,j(p,q),
0 if pξA(ξ,j) + qξ,j > DCVξ,j(p,q).
Therefore, given delivery rates, the physical bundle, PDµ,j(p,q,τ), that one unit of asset j, that was
negotiated at node ξ, delivers at a node µ ∈ ξ
+ consists of the part of the promises Aµ,j that are eﬀectively
delivered and also of the physical deliveries made by the garnished collateral. More precisely,
(B.1) PDµ,j(p,q,τ)












Analogously, the ﬁnancial (unitary) deliveries are,
(B.2) FDµ,j(p,q,τ) = (1 − τµ,j)
X
j06=j
(τµ,j01j0 + FDµ,j0(p,q,τ)) (C
F
ξ,j(qξ))j0,
where 1j0 denotes the portfolio composed only by one unit of asset j
0. Thus, eﬀective deliveries can be
rewritten as, Dµ,j(p,q) = pµPDµ,j(p,q,τ) + qµFDµ,j(p,q,τ) + τµ,jqµ,j. Therefore, using pricing equation



































As ﬁnancial deliveries of an asset j ∈ Λ0 are always zero, its fundamental value at node ξ under (Γ,τ),























Note that, when agents anticipate that, in the borderline case, asset j pays the original promises, equation
above coincides with the deﬁnition given by (19). Moreover, as we can order assets in a pyramiding structure,BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 35








































It follows that the fundamental value at ξ is always well deﬁned and less than or equal to the asset price,
qξ,j.
Definition 4. Given equilibrium prices (p,q) ∈ P, we say that an asset j ∈ Λk has a (Γ,τ)-bubble at a
node ξ when qξ,j > Fj(ξ,p,q,Γ,τ).
Analogously to Theorem 4, given an asset j ∈ Λk, when commodities are free of Γ-bubbles and assets in
previous layers do not have bubbles under (Γ,τ), the asset j’ price coincides with the fundamental value if
the future price is asymptotically zero,
Theorem 4-A. Under Assumptions C and D, given equilibrium prices (p,q), the following conditions are
suﬃcient for the absence of a (Γ,τ)-bubble in asset j ∈ Λk at nodes in D(ξ),
pξ,l − Fl(ξ,p,q,Γ) = 0, ∀l ∈ L; (B.4)
qµ,j0 − Fj0(µ,p,q,Γ,τ) = 0, ∀µ > ξ; ∀j







qµ,j = 0. (B.6)
Proof. Given an asset j ∈ Λk, it follows from the deﬁnition of the (Γ,τ)-fundamental-value and equation
(B.3) that, when commodities, and assets in
S












As condition (B.6) implies equation above, we conclude the proof. 
Thus, under bounded collateral requirements, bubbles can ruled out for assets in Λk, provided that the
individual endowments of some agent are well behaved, in the following sense,
Corollary 4.3-A Given equilibrium prices (p,q), suppose that Assumptions C and D hold and that each
asset in
S
r≤k Λr has uniformly bounded collateral requirements. Then, independently of the delivery rates
τ that are chosen, each asset j ∈ Λk is free of (Γ,τ)-bubbles in D(ξ) provided that, either
a. There exists an agent h which has cumulated physical endowments that are uniformly bounded away
from zero in the sub-tree D(ξ), and satisfying also condition (17) under Γ at ξ; or,
b. There is an agent h that has new endowments, (w
h
µ)µ≥ξ, uniformly bounded away from zero, and
there exists a matrix Y such that Yξ,µ ≤ Y , for each node µ > ξ.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 4.3, uses Theorem 4-A instead of Theorem 4, but
requires a recursive application of the arguments, layer by layer in the pyramid structure of assets. 36 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Appendix C. Transversality conditions of Example 2.




















































































Appendix D. Proof of Equilibrium Existence Theorem
As in Araujo, P´ ascoa and Torres-Martinez (2002), we prove ﬁrst that there exists equilibria in ﬁnite hori-
zon economies. Then, an equilibrium for the inﬁnite horizon economy will be found as a limit of equilibria
of truncated economies, when the time horizon goes to inﬁnity.
Equilibria in truncated economies. Deﬁne, for each T ∈ N, a truncated economy, E
T, with T +1 dates,
in which agents are restricted to consume and trade assets in the event-tree D
T. Thus, using the notation
of Section 3 and given prices (p,q) ∈ P
T, where
P






: ||pξ||Σ + ||qξ||Σ = 1, ∀ξ ∈ D
T},
each agent h ∈ H has the objective to chose, at each node ξ ∈ D








ξ ) ∈ Z in

















≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T,
zξ = (xξ,θξ,ϕξ) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T.










h,T(p,q) be the truncated budget set of agent h in E
T. That is, the set of plans (zξ)ξ∈DT that
satisfy the restrictions of problem P
h,T above.
An equilibrium for the truncated economy E








ξ,j), for each node ξ ∈ D









such that: (1) z
h,T is an optimal solution for P
h,T, at prices (p
T,q
T); (2) Physical and ﬁnancial market
clear, in the sense of Deﬁnition 1, at each node ξ ∈ D
T (i.e. condition C and D hold); and (3) for each nodeBUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 37
ξ ∈ D
T \ {ξ0}, delivery rates λ
T
ξ,j satisfy condition B of Deﬁnition 1.
As a ﬁrst step, let us restrict the space of consumption and portfolios allocations in E
T to a compact set.
Assumption A assures that collateral requirements are diﬀerent from zero (as vectors), which implies that,
























Moreover, Assumptions A and B guarantee that assets can be ordered in a pyramiding structure, whose
basic layer (composed by assets backed only by physical collateral) is non-empty (see Remark 1). Thus, the






ξ)(h,ξ)∈H×DT that satisfy market
clearing conditions C and D of Deﬁnition 1, are bounded in D
T.
In fact, autonomous consumption allocations, (x
h
ξ)(h,ξ)∈H×DT are bounded by above, node by node, by
the aggregated physical endowments. The short-sales, (ϕ
h
ξ,j)(h,ξ)∈H×DT , of an asset j that is backed by
physical collateral are bounded, at each node ξ ∈ D
T, by
P
l∈L Wξ,l divided by the minimum quantity of
(non-zero) collateral, c
P
ξ,j. Thus, the autonomous long positions (θ
h
ξ,j)(h,ξ)∈H×DT , of an asset j with non-zero
physical collateral, are also bounded, because are less than or equal to the aggregate short sales plus the
initial positive net supply. Finally, the short and (autonomous) long positions of assets that are backed only
by ﬁnancial collateral are bounded by above too. It is suﬃcient to apply the previous arguments recursively
along the diﬀerent layers in which we divided the set J.
Therefore, we can restrict, without loss of generality, the space of plans of each agent h ∈ H to the
convex and compact set K






+ : ||z||Σ ≤ 2Υ
T}, which has in
its interior the vector Υ
T of upper bounds for the feasible allocations in D
T.
Note that, if we assure the existence of equilibrium for the compact (and truncated) economy, denoted
by E
T(K
T), the ﬁnite horizon economy E
T has also an equilibrium, given that optimal allocation of E
T(K
T)
will be interior points of set K
T, budget sets are convex and utility functions are concave (see Claim B3
below).
It follows that, in order to ﬁnd an equilibrium for the truncated economy E









ξ,j), for each node ξ ∈ D
T \ {ξ0}, and
allocations (z
h,T






ξ )ξ∈DT , compatible with conditions B, C and D of Deﬁnition 1,





















≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ D
T,
(zξ)ξ∈DT = (xξ,θξ,ϕξ)ξ∈DT ∈ K
T.
Generalized Games. In order to prove the existence of equilibrium in the compact economy, we use a
generalized game. Before describing the game, we deﬁne, for each pair (ξ,j) in D
















Now, in the generalized game, that will be denoted by G
T, each consumer h ∈ H takes prices (p,q) ∈ P
T as
given and solves the compact truncated problem above. Moreover, associated with each pair (ξ,j) ∈ D
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The other player, given prices (p,q) ∈ P




[λ(pξA(ξ,j) + qξ,j) + (1 − λ)DCVξ,j(p,q)],
where, for each j ∈ J and (p,q) ∈ P
T, the vector (A(ξ0,j),DCVξ0,j(p,q)) := (0,2), which implies that
λξ0,j = 1, for each j ∈ J. Finally, associated to each node in D












j∈J K(ξ,j) and delivery rates
λξ,j ∈ [0,1] has the objective to ﬁnd prices (pξ,qξ) ∈ ∆
L+J−1




















































































































An equilibrium for G















simultaneously the problems above. That is, (1) given the prices (p
T,q
T) ∈ P
T, the plan (z
h,T
ξ )ξ∈DT is a
solution of P
h,T(K
T), (2) given the individual plans (z
h,T)h∈H, and the collateral bundles (M
P,T,M
F,T),
for each node ξ ∈ D
T, the auctioneer which chooses prices solves (D.5), and (3) given prices, each player
whose task is to choose collateral requirements or payment rates is also optimizing.
Lemma D1. For each T ∈ N there is an equilibrium for the generalized game G
T.
Proof. The objective function of each participant in the game is continuous and quasi-concave in the own
strategy. For ﬁctitious players and auctioneers, the correspondences of admissible strategies are continuous,
with non-empty, convex and compact values. Also, the budget restriction correspondence of each agent,
(p,q)  B
h,T(p,q) ∩ K
T, has non-empty, convex and compact values. Therefore, in order to ﬁnd an
equilibrium of the generalized game (as a ﬁxed point of the set function given by the product of optimal
strategies correspondences), it is suﬃcient to prove that budget set correspondences are continuous.
The upper hemi-continuity follows from compact values and closed graph properties, that are a direct
consequence of continuity of functions g
h
ξ. Thus, as is usual in general equilibrium, the main diﬃculty resides
in showing the lower hemi-continuity property. Now, as for each price (p,q) ∈ P
T the set B
h,T(p,q) ∩
K
T is convex and compact, it is suﬃcient to assure that the (relative) interior correspondence (p,q) 
int(B
h,T(p,q)) ∩ K
T has non-empty values. But this last property follows from Assumption C.BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 39
In fact, cumulated endowments are such that W
h
ξ  0, for each agent h ∈ H, and, therefore, given any









































is budget feasible and belongs to the relative interior of the set B
h,T(p,q) ∩ K. 
Lemma D2. For each T ∈ N there is an equilibrium for E
T(K
T).
Proof. The previous claim guarantees that there exists an equilibrium for the generalized game G
T, which














ξ∈DT . By deﬁnition, the payment rates λ
h,T
ξ,j
satisfy condition B of Deﬁnition 1 and each agent h ∈ H solves problem P
h,T(K
T) by choosing the plan
(z
h,T
ξ )ξ∈DT . Thus, it is suﬃcient to verify, for each node ξ ∈ D
T, the validity of conditions C and D of
Deﬁnition 1.
Now, it follows from players’ objective functions that, for each (ξ,j) ∈ D






















ξ A(ξ,j) + q
T


















the optimal value of auctioneers objective functions is less than or equal to zero. This implies that conditions
C and D of Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed as inequalities. That is, there does not exist excess demand in physical
and ﬁnancial markets.
Thus, as the individual demands for commodities or assets are bounded by the aggregate supply of
resources, the optimal bundles that were chosen by the agents are interior points of K
T. Therefore, mono-
tonicity of utility function implies that inequality (D.6) holds as equality, which implies that Walras’ law is
satisﬁed, at each node in D
T.
The existence of an optimal solution for problem P
h,T(K




ξ  0 and, therefore, condition C of Deﬁnition 1 holds, as a direct consequence of Walras’ law, strictly
positive commodity prices and the absence of excess demand in physical markets. By analogous arguments,
condition D of Deﬁnition 1 holds, at a node ξ ∈ D




Finally, given a node ξ ∈ D
T, denote by ˜ Jξ ⊂ J the set of assets that have zero price at ξ, i.e.
q
T
























Now, if j ∈ ˜ Jξ, then optimality of agents’ allocations assures that the asset does not deliver any payment
at the successor nodes µ ∈ ξ
+ (if this nodes are in D
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we assure that, at node ξ, and for asset j, condition D holds. Moreover, the new allocation is budget feasible,
optimal and we do not lose the market clearing condition in physical markets at node µ ∈ ξ
+, as asset j
does not deliver any payment at these nodes.
However, the total supply of asset j at nodes µ ∈ ξ
+ can change and, therefore, in order to apply the
trick above, node by node, asset by asset, to obtain an optimal allocation that satisﬁes Condition D for each
















T)µ,j < 0 only for
assets in ˜ Jµ.

















Now, as at each µ ∈ ξ
+, Dξ,j(p
T,q
T) = 0 if q
T
µ,j > 0 then asset j defaults at node µ, which implies that
λ
T














T)µ,j, which concludes the proof. 
Lemma D3. For each T ∈ N, there is an equilibrium for E
T.
Proof. In the previous claim we found an equilibrium for the compact economy E
T(K
T). We aﬃrm that
this equilibrium constitutes also an equilibrium for E
T. As feasibility conditions are satisﬁed, it is suﬃcient
to prove that, for each agent h ∈ H, the plan ˜ z
h,T, which is a solution of P
h,T(K
T), solves problem P
h,T.
Now, if the plan ˜ z
h,T is not optimal in P













ξ ). Thus, as B
h,T(p
T,q





π ∈ [0,1) the plan z
π = (z
π
ξ )ξ∈DT deﬁned by z
π
ξ = π˜ z
h,T















which is a consequence of concavity of functions v
h
ξ. Therefore, independently of the value of π ∈ [0,1), the
plan z
π / ∈ K
T, which contradicts the fact that ˜ z
h,T ∈ int(K
T). 












know that there exist non-negative multipliers (γ
h,T








ξ− ;p,q) = 0, and the
following saddle point property is satisﬁed, for each nonnegative plan (zξ)ξ∈DT (see Rockafellar (1997),
























Thus, analogously to Claim A1 in Appendix A, it follows that, for each ξ ∈ D and for all T ≥ t(ξ),
















ξ = minl∈L W
h




ξ ) ≤ u
h
ξ(Wξ) it follows that,










Lemma D4. For each node ξ ∈ D, there is a strictly positive lower bound for the sequence (||p
T
ξ ||Σ)T>t(ξ).
Proof. Given ξ ∈ D and T > t(ξ), optimality of z
h,T in P





j ∈ J (by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2, in Appendix A). Thus, given an asset j ∈ Λ0,BUBBLES, COLLATERAL AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 41

































ξ ||Σ. Thus, adding in j, we obtain that ||q
T



















Therefore, it follows from equation (D.9) that, for each node ξ ∈ D, the sequence of equilibrium alloca-















, is bounded. Therefore, applying
























, ask → +∞.









are budget feasible, at prices (p,q) ∈ P, and satisfy market fea-














satisﬁes the Euler and the transversality conditions.








































 · (y − z
h
ξ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to those made in Claims A2 and A3 (Appendix A), changing prices (p,q)
by (p
T,q










































which implies, by the same arguments made in the proof of Proposition 1 (see Appendix A) that the Euler
equations and the transversality condition hold. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 1 that the allocation
(z
h
ξ)ξ∈D is optimal for agent h ∈ H, which concludes the proof of the theorem.42 ALOISIO ARAUJO, M´ ARIO R. P´ ASCOA, AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
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